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Political Factors and the Adoption of the Merit System of
Judicial Selection

Joshua E. Montgomery

Abstract
There is widespread debate among politicians and academics as to the effectiveness
and appropriateness of the merit system of judicial selection. Much of the literature on
this subject is dedicated to the effects of the merit system after it has been adopted. The
purpose of this paper was to examine the effects of certain political factors that may
have created a political environment conducive to the adoption of the merit system. In
this paper, three hypotheses were postulated and subsequently tested. The results of
each test, while not as conclusive as anticipated, confirmed each of the hypotheses. The
first conclusion of this study was that states are more likely than not to have the same
party in control of both houses of the state legislature. The second conclusion was that
states that adopted the merit system experienced a smaller amount of majority-party
change in both houses of their legislatures prior to the adoption of the merit system
than states that did not adopt the merit system. The final conclusion was that most
states are more likely to adopt the merit system when they are bordered by other states
that have the merit system.
1. Introduction
The merit system of judicial selection is the process by which the governor of a
particular state selects a person from a short list of candidates, which is compiled by a
non-partisan nominating commission. The nominating commission then appoints that
person as a judge for a short, initial term. After serving out the initial term, the judge
runs in a retention election (Dubois, 1990). In a retention election, the judge does not
run against any other candidates and does not run on any party platform. Instead, the
judge runs against his or her record and wins re-election by garnering a specified
percentage of votes approving his or her retention of the judgeship (Canes-Wrone,
1

Clark, & Park, 2010). If a judge is retained, he or she then serves a full term in office
(Dubois, 1990). The merit system is a method of selecting judges that is increasingly
being implemented in the United States, and as such, it is an intriguing area of study.
There has been a substantial amount of research regarding this topic in areas such as
judicial decision making patterns of judges selected through the merit system, voter
confidence in different methods of judicial decision making, and the role of money in
judicial campaigns. Interestingly, the majority of the research regarding the merit
system has focused on the effects of the merit system once it has been adopted, but not
much of the research has focused on the events and conditions which may have led to the
adoption of the merit system.
2. Literature Review: Merit Selection in the States
There has been a substantial amount of scholarly research devoted to the study of
the evolving methods of judicial selection in the states. This body of research has been
conducted over the last several decades and has sought to determine the consequences
of judicial reform. There has been research conducted which suggests that adoption of
the merit system can increase judicial independence and there has been research that is
inconclusive on the subject. Similarly, there has been research conducted which
investigates the positive and negative impact of money on judicial campaigns. Perhaps
more relevant to the subject of this paper are the studies investigating the ability – or
inability – of the merit selection to mitigate the negative impact of money on judicial
campaigns, and ultimately the impact of money on judicial decisions made once judges
are in office. Lastly, research has been conducted regarding the impact of campaigns on
judicial decision-making.

2.1 A Brief History of the American Judiciary
Before discussing specific changes that have taken place over time in state judicial
selection methods, it is necessary to examine the origins of the modern American
judiciary and the values on which it was founded. Even before the time that the United
States of America was formally founded as a sovereign country, it was argued that the
judiciary should be independent from the other branches of government. In the mid1700s, there was much agitation within the American colonies regarding the influence
of the King of England on colonial judiciaries (Bailyn, 1967). The colonial governments
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feared that justices who received their commissions and salaries from the Crown (the
King of England) would not be able to effectively serve the role of a proper judiciary.
The role of a proper judiciary, according to John Dickinson, was to “settle the contests
between prerogative and liberty… to ascertain the bounds of sovereign power, and to
determine the rights of the subject,” (as quoted in Bailyn, 1967, p. 74). The colonies
argued that these duties of a proper judiciary could not be fulfilled by a judiciary
dependent on the Crown for its commissions and salaries, especially when the
commissions could be easily revoked. In addition to many other important issues, these
frustrations over the interference of the British executive in the American colonies’
judiciaries led to the American Revolution, which ultimately ended with the United
States of America gaining independence from the British.
The values on which the modern American judiciary was created were in place even
before United States was founded. The concepts of accountability, independence, and
impartiality were the cornerstones of the American judiciary. As John Dickinson
expressed, proper government must be accountable to the people, and the judiciary was
no exception (Bailyn, 1967). In Dickinson’s view, the judiciary should, however, be
independent from the executive. At the time of Dickinson’s writing of his Letters from a
Farmer in Pennsylvania, the governing executive was the King of England, and the
judiciary was not independent from the executive (Bailyn, 1967). Some political figures
of that time, such as John Adams, made the assertion that the jury system, which
allowed for a trial-by-jury, allowed citizens to share in both judicial proceedings and the
execution of laws (Bailyn, 1967). However, in some colonies, even jury trials were
deemed illegal by the British government. The third important value, impartiality, was
nearly impossible to realize in colonial America. The following excerpt from Bailyn’s
Origins of the American Revolution effectively summarizes the frustrations of colonial
Americans on the subject of the judiciary:
“Unless the judiciary could stand upon its own firm and independent
foundations – unless, that is, judges held their positions by permanent tenure in
no way dependent upon the will and pleasure of the executive – it would be
ridiculous “to look for strict impartiality and a pure administration of justice, to
expect that power should be confined within its legal limits, and right and justice
done to the subject.” (Bailyn, 1967, p. 74-75).
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As the following sections of this paper will show, there was not one system of
judicial selection that was adopted in every state. While the colonies, and later states,
could agree that the British executive’s direct involvement in the American judiciary
was both unconstitutional and problematic, finding a standard alternative was less
simple. However, in every state, judges were either directly elected by the people or
were appointed and confirmed by popularly elected officials (National Center for State
Courts, 2015).
2.2. The Concept of Merit
The Merriam-Webster dictionary provides three definitions of the word “merit,”
and they are as follows: 1) a good quality that deserves to be praised, 2) the quality of
being good, important, or useful, and 3) having value or worth (Merriam-Webster,
2015). In the context of the judiciary, a judge who has merit would be a person who is
qualified for and competent in that position. Merriam-Webster also provides a
definition of a “merit system.” A “Merit system” is defined as “a system by which
appointments and promotions in the civil service are based on competence rather than
political favoritism,” (Merriam-Webster, 2015). Based solely on these definitions, a
merit system of judicial selection sounds like an ideal method for selecting justices.
However, the concept of merit in American politics is not as simple as these definitions
may lead one to believe.
The United States Constitution remains fairly quiet on the requirements for justices
of the Supreme Court, and leaves the creation of state courts up to the state legislatures.
As Frost and Lindquist note, the United States were created as a constitutional
democracy, which gives its citizens the right to govern themselves, albeit almost always
through indirect means (2010). The United States were founded partially on the liberal
democratic ideals of individual rights, freedom, and equality, which are realized
through free and fair elections, as evidenced in the text of the Constitution (U.S. Const.
art I; Rautenfeld, 2004). However, the American Bar Association notes that the original
thirteen states did not have direct elections of their state judges, but rather judges were
selected through gubernatorial appointments or legislative appointments (2000). The
liberal democratic values of free and fair elections do not guarantee that the person
most qualified to serve in any particular office will be elected to that office. In other
words, the person with the most merit may not be elected to office.
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As more and more states modified their judicial selection methods towards direct
elections and away from appointments, it could be argued that the methods of judicial
selection were beginning to be more closely aligned with liberal democratic values
(ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000). However, as the American
Bar Association has repeatedly pointed out, direct elections of judges became
increasingly political and more prone to foster both corruption and biased rulings –
things the United States were founded in an attempt to avoid (2000). The so-called
“merit system” seeks to protect individual rights through fair and unbiased rulings that
uphold the rule of law, (laws which provide for the protection of individual rights),
through a system that seeks to place a judge with the greatest merit – the person most
qualified to make a correct and unbiased ruling – in the adjudicating position (ABA
Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000). The merit system does not ignore
the voice of the people, however, as it requires judges to face a yes-or-no retention
election every several years, in which the voting public directly decides if a judge will
continue to serve.
Interestingly, while corruption within the judiciary has always been a concern in this
country, the perceived catalyst of that corruption has shifted over the years. In
America’s formative years, ties to the executive branch of government were initially
seen as the primary source of corruption (Bailyn, 1967). In the last several decades, the
threat of corruption in the judiciary is perceived as stemming from the increasingly
political nature of judicial campaigns (Frost & Lindquist, 2010). While the American
judiciary is independent from the executive branch of the government, proponents of
the merit system argue that a judiciary independent of corrupting political pressures is
necessary (Frost & Lindquist, 2010; ABA Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence, 2000; and ABA Coalition of Justice, 2008). Lastly, the concept of
impartiality is one that proponents of the merit system say is more easily attainable
through the merit system than through other selection methods. Not only are judicial
candidates chosen by a number of knowledgeable individuals based on their merit, but
they must run against their record after a short initial term (Frost & Lindquist, 2010;
ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000; and ABA Coalition of
Justice, 2008). One could even say that in the merit system, primary retention elections
are simply the procedures by which the voting citizens determine the merit of their
judges.
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2.3 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Merit System
The American Bar Association has set forth a set of standards after which states can
model their judicial selection systems in a report titled “Standards on State Judicial
Selection” (2000). The standards were established in an attempt to help states establish
efficient judicial selection systems that select the most qualified candidates. The
standards were presented in three sections: Part A: Judicial Selection and Retention
Criteria, Part B: Primary Actors in Selection Process, and Part C: Supporting Actors in
Selection Process (ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000). Part A
outlines criteria and qualifications for selection and retention of judges. In order to be
selected as a possible candidate, an individual must meet certain experience, integrity,
competence, temperament, and commitment-to-the-law criteria. In order for a judge to
be retained, the ABA’s standards call for the examination of a judges behavior while in
office, and provide criteria for doing so. Part B outlines the actors that should be
present in the selection process. These actors include: the Judicial Eligibility
Commission, the Judicial Nominating Commission, the appointing authority, the
endorsing authority, and the retention evaluation body (ABA Standing Committee on
Judicial Independence, 2000). The final section of the report identifies who the
supporting actors may be in the judicial selection process. These include: bar
associations, judicial candidates, individual attorneys, public and private organizations,
and media interests (ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, 2000).
2.4 The “Missouri Plan” and Changes in State Selection Methods
In his article “Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts”, Hanssen noted that there are currently five distinct methods of selecting
judges in the American States. Those methods are 1) partisan elections, 2) non-partisan
elections, 3) gubernatorial appointment, 4) legislative appointment, and 5) the merit
system, which combines appointment and election components (2004). In the early
years of the United States, judges – many of whom had ties to the Royal Crown in
England – were trusted less than elected representatives from among the American
people, who were seen as more able to fairly govern citizens (Hanssen, 2004). As such,
the judiciaries in the states were highly accountable to their respective legislatures.
Throughout the following decades as the nation grew and evolved, the courts were
given more independence. Many state courts modified their selection methods,
changing from gubernatorial and legislative appointments to partisan elections
6

(Hanssen, 2004). This gave the courts a great deal of independence from the executive
and legislative branches.
Sometime around the early 1900s, public concern began to arise regarding
partisan judicial elections. The adoption of partisan elections did indeed give state
judges a level of independence, albeit only from the other branches of government
(Hanssen, 2004). While judges gained independence from the other branches of
government, they also became tethered by the partisan politics through which they
obtained their offices. Hanssen (2004) asserted that many states eventually moved to
non-partisan elections in an attempt to mitigate the ability of “partisan forces” to
capture elections (448). After several more decades, the merit system of judicial
selection was adopted in 1940 in Missouri, marking a new era of change in state courts
(Dubois, 1990).
The merit system of judicial selection that has been adopted in many states was first
introduced in 1914 by a University of Northwestern Law Professor by the name of
Albert M. Kales. It has since become known as the “Missouri Plan”, after Missouri
became the first state to adopt it in 1940 (Dubois, 1990). As Puro et al. noted, after
Missouri adopted the merit system in 1940, it was "virtually ignored for eighteen years
and then adopted, in fairly rapid succession, by nineteen additional states over the next
eighteen years” (as cited in Dubois, 1990, p. 25). States began to implement the merit
system to select their judges in varying ways. In the majority of states, this was
accomplished through the passage of state constitutional amendments. The specifics of
these amendments, such as the role of the state bar association in creating nominating
commissions were formal, constitutional agreements, while others were merely spoken
agreements between the governor and the state bar (Sheldon, 1977). Most of the states
that adopted the merit system did so between 1958 and 1976, which is a relatively short
amount of time when considering how long these states have established judiciaries
(Dubois, 1990). It is possible that states are more likely to enact institutional change
when they have had a chance to observe the same change in a neighboring state, and it
is one of the hypotheses of this paper that such is the case.
2.5 Merit Selection and Judicial Independence
One of the main areas of debate and research with regards to the merit system is its
impact on judicial independence. In his article Methods of Judicial Selection and their
7

Impact on Judicial Independence, Gardner-Geyh defines an independent judiciary as one
that is “insulated from political and other controls that could undermine their impartial
judgment” (2008). Gardner-Geyh noted that judicial independence is widely regarded
within legal professions as positive and necessary for the judiciary to uphold the rule of
law (2008). Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park also noted that societal benefits such as civil
liberties and economic growth are associated with Judicial independence and assert that
the legitimacy of the courts hinges on judicial independence (2010). On the other side of
the debate is the concept of judicial accountability - which can be described as
promoting institutional responsibility within the courts and collectively holding judges
accountable for their actions as the third branch of government (Gardner-Geyh, 2008).
Often, these two concepts – judicial independence and judicial accountability – conflict
with one another. It is argued that the more publicly accountable judges are, the less
independent they are (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010).
The merit system was developed in attempt to balance these two important aspects
of the American Judiciary. When considering how best to balance these two aspects, it
is important first consider several preliminary questions. As Harold See asked in his
article Judicial Selection and Decisional Independence, what is an appropriate level of
popular control in any particular state? (1998). See (1998) pointed out that if judges in a
particular state have acted as a “superlegislature”, meaning that judges use their
positions to “implement their own public policy predilections”, then it may be most
appropriate for the public to select judges in the same way they select their legislators
(p. 144). The second question See raised dealt with the frame of reference one uses
when evaluating the merits of elections and/or appointments. See (1998) asked “what
system offers the public the level of judicial accountability that is appropriate to the way
in which judges function and are expected to function in their jurisdiction?” (p. 144).
See (1998) urged caution and consideration of the differences among each state when
answering this question. See’s third and final recommendation was for reformers and
legal professionals to carefully examine the factors which have caused unrest with
current judicial selection methods. These factors will likely include things such as the
tone of judicial elections – whether the campaign is civil and about issues or whether it
is personal and degrading – and the amount of money which is spent on judicial
elections.
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As Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park stated in their study titled Judicial Independence and
Retention Elections, a common assumption is that the absence of a contested judicial
election will lead to judicial independence (2010). Research conducted by Franklin
(2002) and Caldarone, et al (2009) argues that the afore-mentioned assumption is wellfounded and claim that judicial independence is indeed more achievable through the
merit system than it is through elections (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010). CanesWrone, Clark, & Park’s research led them to a significantly different conclusion than
Franklin and Caldarone, et al reached. Canes-Wrone, Clark, and Park analyzed both
state supreme court decisions on the issue of abortion and public opinion regarding
abortion from 1980 to present. Their results showed that, contrary to the common
assumption, as public opinion on abortion shifted more in favor of abortion, judges
began deciding cases in a more pro-life fashion (Canes-Wrone, Clark, & Park, 2010). As
shown by the conflicting results of these studies mentioned above, the scholarship on
the subject of merit selection and its impact on judicial independence is divided and
inconclusive.
2.6 Merit Selection, Money, and Politics
An area of ever-increasing debate and research is being devoted to the increasing
amounts of money that are being spent on judicial campaigns. The impact of money on
judicial selection is an important one because the amount of money spent on judicial
campaigns, if excessive, could potentially upset the balance of judicial independence
and accountability (Shepherd, 2009). In her article Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice,
Shepherd pointed out that roughly ninety percent of all judicial matters in the United
States are handled through the State courts, and roughly ninety percent of all state-court
judges are elected through elections of one form or another (2009). When these two
numbers are considered together, it becomes apparent that the vast majority of judicial
matters at some point are handled by judges who either gained or retained their office
through an election. The results of Shepherd’s study of State Supreme Court decisions
from all fifty states in the United States revealed two major findings. The first was that
elections, particularly partisan elections, are much more likely to be heavily contested
than other methods of judicial selection, and the second major finding was that judges
up for re-election in partisan elections were likely to appeal to their “retention agents” –
the voting public – in order to keep their jobs by ruling in non-controversial and
popular ways (Shepherd, 2009). The combination of these two findings creates a
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situation in which the rule of law and pursuit of justice can become secondary to reelection.
Shephard’s study also investigated the effects money can have on the voting habits
of judges. By measuring how likely judges were to vote in favor of certain groups
which made campaign contributions in both partisan and non-partisan elections,
Shephard was able to determine that there was a correlation (2009). Shephard
investigated the relationship between the voting patterns of judges in cases dealing
with pro-business groups, pro-labor groups, doctors and hospitals, insurance
companies, and lawyer groups. Shephard found that, with the exception of lawyer
groups who made campaign contributions, judges are more likely to vote in favor of
groups that made financial contributions to their campaigns (2009). Importantly,
Shephard pointed out that while there was a correlation between campaign
contributions and the voting patterns of judges, the data could not specify which way
the causality ran (2009). Essentially, Shephard’s data could not definitively say that the
campaign contributions influenced the judges’ decisions, and not vice versa.
The above-described phenomenon was discussed at length by Martin Redish and
Jenifer Aronoff in their article, The Real Constitutional Problem with State Judicial Selection:
Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism (2014). In this
article, Redish and Aronoff take a position which is similar to the position reached by
Shepherd. While Shephard’s data and conclusions seem to be predicated on the
assumption that influences on judges deciding cases are inherently bad, Redish and
Aronoff (2014) take a more legally-minded approach to the issue, particularly in the
area of due process. Redish and Aronoff (2014) state that, “requiring judges to submit
to popularly grounded methodologies to remain in office violates core constitutional
values both in theory and in practice” (p. 33). Here the authors are simply
acknowledging that judges have a right to rule against popular opinion if they believe
such a ruling is appropriate. The authors quote U. S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia in his explanation of due process and elections when he stated that:
“Elected judges—regardless of whether they have announced any views
beforehand—always face the pressure of an electorate who might disagree with
their rulings and therefore vote them off the bench.... So if, as Justice Ginsburg
claims, it violates due process for a judge to sit in a case in which ruling one way
rather than another increases his prospects for reelection, then—quite simply—
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the practice of electing judges is itself a violation of due process.“ (Redish &
Aronoff, 2014, p. 18).
Redish and Aronoff (2014) acknowledge that here Scalia correctly identifies the
problem with the claim that elections as a means of judicial retention violates due
process. However, Redish and Aronoff (2014) also assert that in his explanation, Justice
Scalia also concedes the real problem with judicial elections: they make judges more apt
to rule in ways that are more compatible with voters’ preferences than they are to rule
in a less popular fashion, even if the less-popular ruling is the correct one.
The title of Choi, Gulati, and Posner’s article is a succinct summary of the conflicting
opinions on methods of judicial selection in the states – Professionals or Politicians: The
Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary (2008). Choi, Gulati
and Posner’s study investigated three aspects of judicial performance: opinion quality,
productivity (number of opinions written), and independence (2008). The authors
analyzed a set of high court opinions from every state over a period of three years. The
author’s results presented some interesting conclusions. Elected judges were found to
be more productive than appointed judges (Choi, Guati, & Posner, 2008). Productivity
was defined as the total number of opinions written in one year by a judge. When
opinion quality was considered, the opinions of appointed judges were found to be
higher than the opinions of elected judges (Choi, Guati, & Posner, 2008). Opinion
quality was defined by the number of out-of-state citation the opinions received. Lastly,
independence of both sets of judges was examined. The results on independence were
inconclusive, as elected judges and appointed judges enjoyed very similar amounts of
independence – a finding not in line with the author’s original hypothesis (Choi, Guati,
& Posner, 2008). Overall, the results of this comprehensive research study seem to
suggest that the conventional wisdom, which holds that appointed judges are more
independent and thus better than elected judges, may not be well-founded and should
be more closely examined.
2.7 The Current State of Affairs
As Redish and Aronoff stated, currently thirty-nine states have some form of
election through which their state court judges are selected (2014). The election method
in these thirty-nine states may be partisan, non-partisan, or retention elections after an
initial appointment (Redish & Aronoff, 2014). Choi, Gulati, and Posner (2008) and Keele
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(2014) further broke down the current systems used by the states. However, Keele’s
numbers are most recent, so they will be used as the data source for the current state
judicial selection systems. Currently, eight states select their judges through partisan
public elections, fourteen states select judges through non-partisan public elections, four
states use some form of gubernatorial appointment, and two states use legislative
appointment to select judges. Another fourteen employ a merit selection system in
which a governor chooses from the nominating commission’s candidates, and eight
states use a merit system in which the selected candidates must receive legislative or
other consent (Redish & Aronoff, 2014). Redish and Aronoff’s list of judicial selection
systems has depicted visually in Figure 2.7a below.

Figure 2.7a

System of Selection

Number of States Employing System

Partisan Public Elections

Eight (8)

Non-Partisan Public Elections

Fourteen (14)

Gubernatorial Appointment

Four (4)

Legislative Appointment

Two (2)

Merit System

Twenty-Two (22) – 14 governor-selected, 8
governor-selected and legislatively confirmed

(Redish & Aronoff, 2014)

3. Hypothesis & Model
This paper investigated the impact of three variables on the decisions of states to
change their judicial selection methods from popular elections or appointments to a
merit system of judicial selection. This was accomplished by testing several variables in
twenty-four states. This paper primarily researched two aspects of the political
environment that may be correlated to the adoption of the merit system. These two
factors are, 1) the patterns of legislative elections, and 2) the adoption of the merit
system by surrounding states. These two factors were examined through the testing of
three hypotheses.
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The first hypothesis states that States that made the change to the merit system of
judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican Party at the time of
the change than by the Democratic Party. Because the merit system, at least
theoretically, provides judges with more insulation from politics, it is expected that the
merit system will be implemented by primarily Republican-majority state legislatures.
It is no secret that in American politics, Democrats tend to be more progressive than
Republicans. For this reason, it is expected that a judicial selection system which allows
justices to serve 8-year terms and be relatively isolated from public opinion would be
appealing to Republican legislatures.
The second hypothesis states that States experience a greater level of consistency in
the majority party in the years leading up to the time the state made the change to the
merit system of judicial selection than states that did not adopt the merit system. The
reasoning behind this claim is simple. As has been discussed already, one of the selling
points for supporters of the merit system is that the merit system balances
independence and accountability and minimizes the role politics play in the courts (See,
1998; Canes-Wrone, Clark & Park, 2010). It seems that a state legislature that has been
governed by one party for a period of at least several elections may not look kindly on
an increasingly politicized judicial selection process. Thus, the hypothesis holds that
states will adopt the merit system after a long period of majority governance by one
party.
The third hypothesis states that states that adopted the merit system were more
likely to be surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than
are states that did not adopt the merit system. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is
simple. States may be hesitant to implement an entirely new form of judicial selection if
they have not had a chance to see it in action. However, based on that same logic, if a
state is bordered by one or more states which have enacted the Missouri Plan, that state
may be more likely to adopt the merit system for itself.

4. Research Design
The three hypotheses that were tested were: 1) States that made the change to the
merit system of judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican
Party at the time of the change than by the Democratic Party, 2) States experience a
13

greater level of consistency in the majority party in the years leading up to the time the
state made the change to the merit system of judicial selection than states that did not
adopt the merit system, and 3) States that adopted the merit system were surrounded
by other states which had already adopted the merit system. Each hypothesis was
tested using a specifically designed research method. The research methods designed
for all three hypotheses are discussed in detail below.

4.1 Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis was that States that made the change to the merit system of
judicial selection were more likely to be governed by the Republican Party at the time of
the change than by the Democratic Party. This was tested by recording which party
was in the majority at the time the merit system was adopted in twelve states’ appellate
courts. The states in the data set are mid-western and western states, with the exception
of Florida. The states that were examined were Arizona, Tennessee, Florida, Iowa,
Indiana, Missouri, South Dakota, Kansas, Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah. The majority
party in both the House of Representatives and Senate for each state within the data set
was measured.
The findings are organized in a chart in Figure 4.1a below. The states which were
the subject of this study are listed in column 1. Column 2 lists the years in which the
merit system was adopted by each state within the data set. Tennessee has two dates
listed because the merit system was adopted once, repealed, and adopted again
(National Center for State Courts, 2015). Column 3 lists the majority party in the House
of Representatives of each corresponding state at the time of the adoption of the merit
system in said state. Lastly, column 4 lists the majority party in each state’s Senate at
the time of the adoption of the merit system in said state. In columns 3 and 4, a lowercase “r” was used to represent the Republican Party as the majority for a particular
state. A capital “D” was used to represent a majority of Democrats in a particular state.
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Figure 4.1a
1. States
Employing Merit
System
Arizona
Tennessee
Florida
Oklahoma
Iowa
Indiana
Missouri
South Dakota
Kansas
Wyoming
Utah
Colorado

2. Year Merit System
Adopted**

3. Majority Party in
Year Merit System
Adopted (House)***

4. Majority Party in
Year Merit System
Adopted (Senate)

1974
1971*, 1994
1976
1987

r
D
D
D

r
D
D
D

1962
1970
1940
1980
1972
1972
1985
1966

r
r
r
r
D
D
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
r
Totals:
r =8, D =4
r =8, D =4
* Tennessee adopted the merit system for all appellate courts in 1971 via an amendment,
but repealed the amendment in 1974. 20 years later, Tennessee once again adopted the
merit system for all appellate courts. Democrats had the majority in Tennessee in both
houses from 1970 - 1994 (National Center for State Courts, 2015; Dubin, 2007).
**Data in Column 2 was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015).
***Data in Columns 3 and 4 was derived from Michael Dubin’s Party Affiliations in the State
Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006 (2007).

The findings shown above in Figure 4.1a are not as strong as what was originally
expected. As is shown in columns 3 and 4, two-thirds of states that adopted the merit
system did so with a majority of Republicans in both the State House and State Senate.
The results indicate that there is indeed a statistical correlation between a majority
Republican House and Senate. However, this correlation is not as strong as was
originally expected. Based on the data shown in Figure 4a, 66.6% of states had a
majority Republican House of Representatives and Senate at the time those states
adopted the merit system. Also, the remaining 33.3% of states had a majority of
Democrats in their House of Representatives and Senate at the time of their adoption of
the merit system.
What is interesting about the findings is the consistency within each state in terms of
the majority party. While the majority party was not the same for all of the states which
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were measured, regardless of which party was in the majority, the same majority party
was in control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate for each state. While
this was not an aspect that the original hypothesis sought to measure, it is nonetheless
noteworthy. Having both houses of the state legislature controlled by the same
majority party is certainly not uncommon, while at the same time the presence of a
different majority party in each of a state’s legislative houses in not uncommon either
(Dubin, 2015). Based on the data in Figure 4.1a, it can certainly be said that there is a
strong correlation between 1) the adoption of the merit system by a state and 2) singleparty control of both houses of that particular state’s legislature.

4.2 Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis was that States experience a greater level of consistency in
the majority party in the years leading up to the time the state made the change to the
merit system of judicial selection than states that did not adopt the merit system. It was
expected that states would not experience a great deal of legislative unrest prior to the
adoption of the merit system. For the purposes of this study, legislative unrest will be
defined as the change in majority party after an election. This occurs when one party is
voted into the majority over the current majority party. This hypothesis was tested by
comparing twelve states that have adopted the merit system – the variable group - to
twelve states that have not adopted the merit system – the control group.
The pattern of the change in majority party was measured in each of twenty-four
mostly-mid-western and western states. The variable group, which was comprised of
states which have adopted the merit system, included Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
The control group, which was comprised of states which have not adopted the merit
system, included Arkansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin.
The period of measurement for each state in the variable group was the two decades
of elections preceding the adoption of the merit system in each state. The actual
calendar-year time period varied for each state because the states being studied adopted
the merit system at different times. For instance, in Iowa, the period of measurement
was from 1942 until 1962 because Iowa adopted the merit system in 1962, whereas the
16

period of measurement for Indiana was 1950 to 1970 because Indiana adopted the merit
system in 1970.
The period of measurement for each state in the control group, (with the exceptions
of Michigan and Mississippi), was 1952-1974. These twenty-two years were selected to
be measured because 1973 was the average year in which the twelve states in the
variable group adopted the merit system. Since most states only held elections in even
years, the period of measurement was expanded to twenty-two years. Kentucky and
Mississippi, which held elections on odd years, were the exceptions. The time period of
measurement for Kentucky was 1953-1973. Due to the fact that Mississippi only held
elections every four years, the period of measurement for Mississippi was expanded to
the twenty-four years between 1951 and 1975. This was done in an attempt to cover the
time period of measurement used for the other ten states.
For the variable group, which is depicted in Figure 4.2a, with the exception of
Kansas, all of the states being studied held legislative elections every two years for both
legislative houses. Kansas’ Senate held elections every four years during the twentyyear time period which was measured. Eleven election cycles were measured for both
houses in all states within the data set, except in the Kansas Senate, which only held 6
elections. Column 1 of Figure 4.2a lists the states in the variable group. Columns 2 and
3 show the pattern of change in majority party after each election in the state’s House of
Representatives and Senate, respectively. The only two parties in control of the state
legislatures were the Republican and Democratic parties. Each letter in Columns 2 and
3 corresponds to the majority party in control after an election. A lowercase “r”
represents the Republican Party, and a capital “D” represents the Democratic Party. For
example, if over three elections, the Republicans have the majority in the first two
elections and the Democrats took the majority in the third election, this would be
depicted as “rr D” in Figure 4.2a. In the instance that neither party held a majority in a
particular election, a capital “T” is used to represent this occurrence. A tie (“T”) is
counted as a change in majority party. In the instance of a tie, neither party has the
required majority to pass laws, so a tie is considered a change in majority party, as
listed in columns 4 and 5.
Columns 4 and 5 of Figure 4.2a list the number of changes between majority parties
over the twenty-year measurement period for the state houses of representatives and
state senates, respectively. These two columns, (4 and 5), depict the level of legislative
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unrest in each state’s legislature in the 11 elections prior to the adoption of the merit
system. Essentially, the larger the number of changes, the greater the amount of
legislative unrest present in a particular state. Column 6 lists the year in which the
merit system was adopted by each state. Column 7 shows the time period which was
measured for each state.
For the control group, which is depicted in Figure 4.2b, all of the data is depicted in
the same fashion as it is Figure 4.2a. Column 1 lists the states in the control group, and
columns 2 and 3 show the pattern of change in each state’s House of Representatives
and Senate, respectively. Columns 4 and 5 show the number of changes in majority
party in each state’s House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, and Column 6
lists the time period of measurement for each state.
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Figure 4.2a – Variable Group
1. States
Employing Merit
System
Arizona
Colorado
Florida
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Missouri
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
Utah
Wyoming

4. Number of
Changes in Majority
Party (House)

5. Number of
Changes in Majority
Party (Senate)

6. Year Merit
System Adopted***

7. Time Period of
Measurement

DDDDDD rrrrr
DDDDDD rrrr D
r D rrr DDD r D r
rrrrr DDD rrr
DDDDDDDDDDDDD** DDDDDDDDDDDDD**

1
6
0

2
2
0

1974
1966
1976

1954-1974
1946-1966
1956-1976

rrrr D rr D rrr
rrrrrrrrrrr
rrrrrrrrrrr
r D rrr DDDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDD
rrrrrr T rrrr
DDDDDDDDDDD
rr D r D rrrrr
r T r D rr D rrrr

4
0
0
3
0
2
0
4
6

4
0
0
1
0
2
0
2
0

1970
1962
1972
1940
1987
1980
1971*, 1994
1985
1972

1950-1970
1942-1962
1952-1972
1920-1940
1967-1987
1960-1980
1974-1994
1965-1984
1952-1972

2.167

1.0834

2. Pattern of Election
(House)****

3. Pattern of Election
(Senate)

rrrrr D r DD rr
rrrrrrrrrrr
rrrrrr*
r DDDDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDD
rrrrrr DD rrr
DDDDDDDDDDD
rrrr DD rrrr
rrrrrrrrrrr
Average Number of Changes:

* Tennessee adopted the merit system for all appellate courts in 1971 via an amendment, but repealed the amendment in 1974. 20 years later, Tennessee
once again adopted the merit system for all appellate courts. Democrats had the majority in Tennessee in both houses from 1970 - 1994 (National Center
for State Courts, 2015; Dubin, 2007).
**Due to legislative reapportionment, there were 2 elections held in Florida in both 1962 and 1966 (Dubin, 2015).
***Data in Columns 1 and 6 derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015).
****Data shown in Columns 2 through 5 derived from Michael Dubin’s Party Affiliations in the State Legislatures: A Year by Year Summary, 1796-2006
(2007).
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Figure 4.2b – Control Group
1. States Not
Employing Merit
System
Arkansas
Illinois
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
New Mexico
North Dakota
Ohio
Texas
Wisconsin

2. Pattern of Election
(House)

3. Pattern of Election
(Senate)

4. Number of
Changes in Majority
Party (House)

5. Number of Changes
in Majority Party
(Senate)

0
5
0
5
3
0
5
1
0
3
0
5
2.25

0
3
0
4
1
0
1
0
2
5
0
1
1.4167

DDDDDDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDDD
rrr D rr D rrrr D
rrrrrrrr T r D
DDDDDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDD
rrr T rr D r DDDD
rrrrrr D r T D
r DDDD rrrrr DD
rrrrr D
DDDDDD
DDDDDD
r DDD rr D rrr D
rr DDDDDDDDDD
r DDDDDDDDDDD
DDDDDDD
rrrrrrrrrrrr
rrrrrr D rrrrr
rrr D rrrrrr DD
rrr D rr T rrrr D
DDDDDDDDDDDD
DDDDDDDDDDDD
rrr D rr D rr DDD
rrrrrrrrrrr D
Average Number of Changes:

6. Time Period of
Measurement
1952-1974*
1953-1973
1952-1974
1951-1975

1952-1974

*The time period of measurement for each state was the 22-year period from 1952-1974. This number is based off of the average year in
which the 12 states in Figure 4.2a adopted the merit system, which was 1973. Because most states held elections only on even years, the
period of measurement was expanded to cover the 21 years prior to the average merit-system adoption date of 1973. Kentucky and
Mississippi, which held elections on odd years, were the exceptions. The time period of measurement for Kentucky was 1953-1973. The
period of measurement for Mississippi was 1951-1975, due to the fact that Mississippi only held elections every four years.
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The data results are consistent with the original hypothesis overall, although the
results are not as strong as originally expected. The original hypothesis predicted that
states would experience a greater level of consistency in the majority party in the years
leading up to the time the state made the change to the merit system of judicial selection
than states that did not adopt the merit system. The average number of changes in
majority party over the time period of measurement was depicted at the bottom of
columns 4 and 5 in both Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b. For the variable group, the
average number of changes in majority party in the state House of Representatives was
2.167 changes. This is only slightly less than the average number of changes that were
found for the control group. The control group’s average number of changes in
majority party in the House of Representatives was 2.25 changes. The same occurrence
was found in the state Senates. For the variable group, the average number of changes
in majority party in the state Senate was 1.0834 changes. This is less than the average
number of changes in the state Senate for the control group, which averaged 1.4167
changes.
The data do show a small number of changes overall in the time period of
measurement for the variable group, suggesting that the hypothesis was correct.
However, while the control group experienced slightly more changes than the variable
group, the control group experienced very few changes as well. While it appears that
there is a correlation between the adoption of the merit system and a state legislature
that has experienced very few changes in majority party, it seems unlikely that such a
situation actually has an impact on the adoption of the merit system.
4.3 Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis predicted that states that adopted the merit system were more
likely to be surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than
are states that did not adopt the merit system. This hypothesis was tested by
comparing eight states that have adopted the merit system – the variable group – to
eight states that have not adopted the merit system – the control group. The states in the
control group were Iowa, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado, Kansas, Tennessee,
Oklahoma, and Nebraska. All of the states selected for the variable group were midwestern states. The states in the control group were also mid-western states and
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included Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Arkansas, New Mexico, and North
Dakota. All sixteen states that were selected for study are connected to each other,
(there are no stand-alone states), and are all Midwestern states. These states were
selected in an attempt to only compare states that were geographically and socioeconomically similar.
The data for the variable-group study are recorded in Figure 4.3a below. Column 1
lists the states that were studied. These states have all adopted the merit system.
Column 2 lists the number of states that share a border with the state in column 1.
Column 3 lists the years in which the merit system was adopted for each state. Column
4 lists the number of bordering states, (of the number listed in column 2), that had
already adopted the merit system by the year (listed in column 3) that the state being
examined adopted the merit system. Column 5 gives the percentage of bordering states that
were already employing the merit system in the year the merit system was adopted in
the state in the corresponding row listed in column 1. The averaged total numbers
listed in columns 2, 4, and 5 are listed in the bottom row of Figure 4.3a.
The data for the control group is presented in Figure 4.3b below. The data is
presented in the exact same format as the data in Figure 4.3a, with the exception of the
date listed in Column 3. The date listed in column 3 of Figure 4.3b is 1973. This was the
average date on which the twelve states from Figure 4.2a adopted the merit system.
This average date was used as the date of measurement for the control group. For each
state listed in column 1 of Figure 4.3b, the number of bordering states which were
employing the merit system in 1973 was measured.
Figure 4.3a – Variable Group
1. States
Employing Merit
System
Iowa
South Dakota
Wyoming
Colorado
Kansas
Tennessee
Oklahoma
Nebraska

2. Number of
Surrounding
States*

3. Year Merit
System Adopted

4. Number
Employing Merit
System at Time of
Adoption

5. Ratio
(%)

7
6
6
7
4
8
6
6

1962
1980
1972
1966
1972
1971, 1994
1987
1962

2
3
1
1
3
1
3
1

28.60%
50%
16.67%
14.29%
75%
12.50%
50%
16.67%
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6.25
Average Total:
1.875
32.97%
Average Total:
*All data in Figure 4.3a was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015).

Figure 4.3b – Control Group
1. States

2. Number of
Surrounding
States

3. Year Measured

4. Number
Employing Merit
System During
Year Measured

5
1
Ohio
7
2
Kentucky
5
3
Illinois
4
1
Wisconsin
1973
4
1
Minnesota
6
2
Arkansas
5
1
New Mexico
3
0
North Dakota
4.875
Average
Total:
1.375
Average Total:
*All data in Figure 4.3b was derived from the National Center for State Courts (2015).

5. Ratio
(%)
20.00%
28.57%
60.00%
25%
25%
33.34%
20%
0.00%
26.49%

The results of the study are consistent with the original hypothesis. The original
hypothesis predicted that states that adopted the merit system were more likely to be
surrounded by other states that had already adopted the merit system than were states
that did not adopt the merit system. As the data in the above two tables shows, states
that adopted the merit system, (the variable group), were bordered by both a greater
number and greater percentage of states that had already adopted the merit system.
States that had not adopted the merit system – the variable group – were bordered by
less merit-system-employing states than the variable group. On average, almost 33% of
the states bordering variable-group states had already adopted the merit system. Only
26% of the variable group states were bordered by states that had already adopted the
merit system.
5. Conclusion
Based on all of the data that was analyzed when testing the three hypotheses,
several conclusions can be drawn, in addition to the conclusions already drawn above.
While the evidence does not overwhelmingly support the assertion that a Republicancontrolled state legislature was more likely to implement the merit system, the data
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does suggest that such is the case. A similar statement can be made with regard to the
level of majority-party consistency in the years leading up to the adoption of the merit
system in the examined states. While the data does overwhelmingly establish that
states that have not adopted the merit system experience more changes in majority
party in their state legislature, the data does suggest that such may be the case. Lastly,
the data also seems to suggest that states that adopt the merit system are likely to be
bordered by other states already utilizing the merit system, although the data is not
conclusive on the subject.
The only definitive conclusion that can be reached from the results of this study is
that more research is needed. There are many other political factors besides the ones
researched for this paper that may lead to the adoption of the merit system. Such things
as the effect of interest groups on state politics at the time of the adoption the merit
system may lend insight into the subject. Also, voter demographics may play role in
the process. One other area of possible research into the subject is the concept of
reapportionment in the states, and more specifically how reapportionment relates to the
afore-mentioned factors with relation to changing judicial selection methods. These
areas of study and more, along with the research presented in this paper, could lend
valuable insight into the nature of changing political practices and values in the United
States of America.
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